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RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-Labor Relations
An interstate railroad company entered into a union shop agreement with labor organizations which represented a majority of the
railroad's employees, pursuant to the RAILWAY LABOR ACT, 44
577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1951). A
group of non-union employees brought suit in a state court and
obtained an order enjoining the performance of the agreement as a
violation of the right-to-work clause of the state constitution, which
injunction was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held:
Congress may authorize the union shop in order to stabilize labor
relations, by virtue of its power to regulate interstate commerce and
free it from obstructions. Thus financial support of the collective
bargaining agency is required by all who receive benefit therefrom if
the union shop agreement is made. Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
Article I, Sec. 8, of the United States Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes. . . ." As of today, these few words grant Congress a broad
regulatory Power. Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916). However until the
mid-1930's, Supreme Court interpretation of the commerce clause
was often guided by the doctrine of "dual federalism," which had as
its principal feature the idea ". . . that the purpose and scope of the
delegated powers of Congress are impliedly limited by the existence
of the reserved powers of the States, or, Congress may not use its
delegated powers to accomplish legislative ends which fall within the
reserved powers of the states." CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS 288 (9th. ed. 1950). See also CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 232 (11th. ed. 1954);
STAT.

SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 42

(1955).

It was

the Supreme Court's duty to draw the line in each case between
state and federal authority, License Cases, 16 U.S. (5 How.) 513
(1874), and from the earliest decisions, the consistent distinction was
that interstate activities were subject to regulation by Congress while
intrastate activities were wholly under state management. Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251 (1918) (Child Labor Case). One of the last cases to apply
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"dual federalism" as such was Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), in which comprehensive federal legislation controlling wages and prices locally was held unconstitutional
as an unwarranted interference with purely interstate activity.
"Where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain
of state power." Id. at 546.
In later decisions the Supreme Court abandoned its philosophy
of "dual federalism" in favor of greatly expanded federal control.
N.L.R.B. v. Jones FJ Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937.
It was held that activities wholly within a state which merely affected
interstate commerce were subject to federal control under the commerce clause. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381
(1940). Operating under this altered philosophy, the Court expressly overruled the Child Labor Case, supra, in United States v.
Darby, 312 U. S.100 (1941). Congressional control was upheld regarding local maintenance employees of a building used by a company dealing in interstate commerce, Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316
U.S. 517 (1942); window cleaners who cleaned windows in a
building used by a company dealing in interstate commerce, Martino
v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173 (1946); employees
of a local newspaper with negligible interstate circulation, Mabee v.
White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); and housewives
working for pay in their own homes, Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U. S.244 (1945). ". . . (E)ven if (the) . . . activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce.. ." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 711
(1942).
A similar reversal of doctrine has occurred in federal regulation
of labor relations in interstate industry. Congress originally exercised
almost no power but gradually extended control until it now has
almost an unlimited power to regulate. Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908), holding unconstitutional an act of Congress prohibiting the discharge of interstate railroad employees because of
union membership, represented a rationale which left Congress with
practically no control over interstate labor relations. The first real
departure from the Adair case was based on Congress' power to
"... facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the
service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation." Texas
e N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
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(1930). Congress may induce collective bargaining to settle labor
disputes with "back shop" repair employees, for ". . . the danger
exists . . . though possibly indefinable in its extent, of interruption
of the transportation service." Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). Acts affecting interstate commerce
are under Congressional control, "... . and are not rendered immune
because they grow out of labor disputes." N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. Congress has the power to protect interstate
commerce from possible "political strikes" by requiring union officers
to take non-Communist oaths. American Comm. Ass'n. v. Douds,
339 U. S. 382 (1950). In accordance with this line of thought, the
decision in the principal case was anticipated when a federal district
court held that § 152(11) of the RAILWAY LABOR ACT, which
authorized the union shop, destroyed any cause of action non-union
employees might have had under state law to enjoin enforcement of
the union shop agreements. Allen v. Southern Ry. Co., 114 F. Supp.
72 (D.N.C. 1953). The route travelled by the Supreme Court in this
area of law is summarized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring
with the decision in the principal case, at p. 241: "We have come
full circle from the point of view in the Adair case."
Seventeen states guaranteeing the "right to work" by statute or
constitutional provision are affected by this decision. The applicable
Texas statute is Art. 5154g, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925). It
should be noted that these state provisions are not totally vitiated
by the decision in the principal case, but at present time are nullified
only as they are in conflict with § 152 (11) of the RAILWAY LABOR
ACT. As the union shop clause is permitted rather than required, and
since a private agreement is necessary to invoke its operation, state
"right to work" laws still have a controlling and determinative influence of labor relations in all fields not affected by the federal
act. It is a matter of speculation whether Congress will choose to
extend this particular regulatory power to other industries, but from
the rationale of the principal case it would seem that such legislation would be upheld as constitutional.
Morton L. Susman

Contracts - Restraint of Trade - Agreements Not to
Compete Upon Termination of Employment
Defendant had agreed in his contract of employment as manager
of plaintiff corporation that upon termination of employment he
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would not be engaged in the same type of business in the same
parish for five years. Following his resignation he began to compete
with plaintiff, thereby violating his agreement, and to entice away
plaintiff's customers. Held: By statute, an agreement by an employee not to engage in any competing business upon termination of
employment is null and void. Baton Rouge Cigarette Service v.
Bloomenstiel, 88 So.2d 742 (La.App. 1956).
Agreements in restraint of trade were void at early common law.
See Anonymous, Y.B., 2 Hen. V, f.5, pl.26 (1415); 5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1634 (Rev.ed. 1937). With little mobility of labor
there was danger of depriving a worker of his livelihood and the
public of his services, in addition to the threat of monopoly. S
WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra. § 1635. Later a distinction was made
between agreements of unlimited restraint and those of partial restraint limited in time and area; only the latter were enforced.
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng.Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
Today, in the absence of statute, an agreement not to compete
upon termination of employment is not contrary to public policy if
the restraint is no greater in time and territory than is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer. Eureka Laundry Co. v.
Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911); Samuel Stores v. Abrams,
94 Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541 (1919); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515 (1932). The hardship upon the employee, the public
policy of free competition and the public interest in not being deprived of the individual's services are elements to be considered.
Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17, R.I. 7, 19 Atl. 712 (1890); Duerling
v. CityBaking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 Atl. 542 (1928); 5 WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra, § 1636.
Statutes in several states generally provide that a contract is void
to the extent that it restrains one from the exercise of his calling,
with the exception of agreements ancillary to the sale of a business or
the dissolution of a partnership. Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 519 (1949).
Thus agreements similar to the one in question have been held void.
Miller Laboratoriesv. Griffin, 200 Okl. 398, 194 P.2nd 877 (1948);
Olson v. Swendiman, 62, N.D. 649, 244 N.W. 870 (1932). As such
contracts are now viewed with more liberality by the common law
than formerly, these statutes cannot be said to be declaratory of the
common law. Miller Laboratories v. Griffin and Olson v. Swendiman, supra. The Alabama statute, however, excludes from invalidation employee agreements not to engage in a similar business and not
to solicit old customers of the employer; thus in Hill v. Rice, 259
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Ala. 587, 67 So.2d 789 (1953), involving employee covenants not
to compete, the common law was applicable. Although the Louisiana
statute refers only to employee agreements, an agreement not to
compete after severance of a partnership was held to violate the
public policy expressed by the statute. Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515,
8 So.2d 361 (1942); see Nelson v. Associated Branch Pilots of Port
of Lake Charles, 63 So.2d 437 (La.App. 1953). The Michigan statute
does not apply to agreements not to use trade secrets, Glucol Mfg.
Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 214 N.W. 152 (1927), and use of lists
of customers may be enjoined, Grand Union Tea Co. v. Dodds, 164
Mich. 50, 128 N.W. 1090 (1910) (involving no express agreement), the cases considering the trade secrets and customer lists to be
property of the employer.
Covenants not to compete after employment are valid in Texas
if the restraint is no greater in time and area than necessary for the
protection of the employer, in accordance with the general doctrine of
reasonableness of restraint. City Ice Delivery Co. v. Evans, 275 S. W.
87 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925); Bettinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co.,
278 S.W. 466 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925). In the Evans case an agreement by an ice wagon driver not to engage in similar work for three
years along the same route nor within "five adjacent squares" was
enforced except as to the five adjacent squares, as the employee's influence was limited to his route. Where only part of a restraint is
reasonable the traditional rule is that the contract is altogether void
unless it is divisible in terms, Trenton Potteriesv. Olyphant, 58 N.J.
Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723 (1899); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 518; but
a recent trend is to partially enforce an agreement only part of which
is reasonable even if it is not in terms divisible. Lewis v. Krueger,
Hutchinson and Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798
(1954); Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99
(1926); FullertonLumber Co.v.Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d
585 (1955). Contra: Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161
(1948). In the Lewis case the Texas Supreme Court held that an
agreement by a surgeon-employee not to practice his profession in
Lubbock County was not invalid because unlimited in time, but the
court limited the restraint to three years, a reasonable time. The
burden is on the employer to establish the reasonableness of the restraint, City Ice Delivery Co. v. Evans and Bettinger v. North Fort
Worth Ice Co., supra; Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis.
133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955); and the question of reasonableness has
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been held to be for the jury in Texas. Southern Properties v. Carpenter, 21 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error dism.
The Louisiana statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23. 921 (1950),
declares invalid an agreement by an employee "not to engage in any
competing business... upon the termination of employment." It is
submitted that the statute is too extreme, as it nullifies such agreements without qualification as to their reasonableness and necessity.
While it is not unreasonable for an employer to attempt to provide
against the loss of trade and good will, it is hardly reasonable or fair
for an employee to entice away his former employer's customers with
whom he has come into contact solely through his employment,
where he has contracted not to so injure his employer. It is conceivable, however, that an agreement merely to refrain from soliciting
away the employer's customers would be valid under the statute, since
it would not be a contract "not to engage in any competing business"; if so, a valuable measure of protection is available for employers. Such solicitation of customers of a former employer has been
held to constitute unfair competition even in the absence of a negative covenant. Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 Atl.

47 (1927). But cf. ContinentalCar-Na-VarCorp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal.
104, 148 P. 2d 9, 12 (1944). The general doctrine of reasonableness
of restraint, under which the agreement in the present case would
probably have been upheld, appears preferable to unqualified nullification by statute of all contracts not to compete after employment.
There should be an equilibrium between the conflicting public
policies of freedom of trade and freedom of contract.
Apart from statute, it is suggested that a proper approach is to
view a covenant not to compete after employment as enforceable
only to the extent in time and space that is reasonably necessary for
the protection of the employer, subject to a further limiting consideration, oppression of the employee. But it would not be equitable
for a court to sever an indivisible contract unless the employer's
complete good faith is manifest. It is further suggested that, at least
where there is equality of bargaining power, it may be as sound to
presume the agreed upon restraint to be valid as it is to place the
burden upon the employer to establish its reasonableness.

John Bailey

Federal Courts-Trade Marks-linfair Competition
Plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the retail merchandising of

maternity apparel in the New York metropolitan area, had com-
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menced doing business in October, 1945, as a partnership under the
name "Maternally Yours." It filed an application for registration
of the trade-mark "Maternally Yours" in December, 1945, and this
trade-mark was duly registered in plaintiff's name in May, 1949.
Defendant opened a maternity shop in New Rochelle, N. Y., in
September, 1946, under the name "Your Maternity Shop," and in
October, 1946, plaintiff served formal notice of trade-mark infringement by defendant. However, defendant continued to operate
under the name "Your Maternity Shop," opened a store within two
blocks of plaintiff's store and continued to expand its business until
plaintiff brought this action for trade-mark infringement and unfair competition. Held: State law controls in questions of unfair
competition, and a federal court has jurisdiction over the question
of unfair competition when it is substantially related to a question
of trade-mark infringement. Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity
Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2nd Cir. 1956).
A federal court, having acquired jurisdiction by reason of the
federal questions involved, has the right to decide all the questions in
the case, even though it decides the federal questions adversely to the
party raising them, or even though it omits to decide the federal
questions at all, but decides on local or state questions only. Siler v.
Louisville FJ Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909). However, the
federal question must not be merely colorable or fraudulently set
up for the purpose of endeavoring to give the court jurisdiction. Penn
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685 (1898). Further, a
non-federal claim might be joined with a federal claim if the nonfederal count differs from the federal count only because it
asserts a different ground for recovery upon substantially the same
state of facts. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 328 (1933). The Hurn
case is the leading case establishing the doctrine that the federal
court has jurisdiction over unfair competition when joined with a
registered trade-mark question, and this doctrine has been incorporated into the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b) (1948).
However, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a claim
for unfair competition resulting from acts committed prior to the
date of registration of plaintiff's trade-mark. Treasure Imports v.
Henry Amdur d Sons, 127 F.2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1942).
The Court in the instant case assumed that substantive law of the
state is controlling on issues of unfair competition based on alleged
trade-mark infringement, and in view of past decisions, such an
assumption seems valid. Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695
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(2nd Cir. 1956); National FruitProduct Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co.,
47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir.
1944). These decisions are a direct result of the decision in Erie Ry.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Before that decision, the
federal courts had been applying federal common law to claims for
unfair competition. In spite of the doctrine of the Erie case, a federal
district court has held that where a federal court has jurisdiction of
an action for infringement of a registered trade-mark and for unfair competition because of the inter-relationship of the issues of
unfair competition with those raised under the trade-mark act,
federal law shall govern both aspects of the complaint, while the
local law of unfair competition is restricted to those cases where federal jurisdiction is sustainable only on diversity. Bulova Watch Co.
v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1946),
has created a difficult problem which has resulted in a difference of
opinion in the lower federal courts. The court in Stauffer v. Exley,
184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950), held that a federal cause of action
is given by the Lanham Act for unfair competition in the use of an
unregistered trade name in interstate commerce. This view was reaffirmed in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1952). In Time, Inc. v. T.I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.
Cal. 1954), the court stated that the Lanham Act gives a federal
cause of action for infringement of trade-marks registered under the
act and for unfair competition in the use of registered trade-marks
as well as trade and commercial names. The court was of the further
opinion that state law may not be permitted to govern actions for
unfair competition in the use of trade-names and trade-marks in
commerce since a uniform national law has been created. Also see

Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.
Cal. 1954).
However, other federal courts have interpreted the Lanham Act
in a different manner and held that it did not create a federal law
of unfair competition available to United States citizens one against
the other, nor did it grant the federal courts any new authority to
hear such controversies between citizens. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v.

Lana Labell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3rd Cir. 1954); Stewart Paint Mfg.
Co. v. United Hardware Distributing Co., 141 F. Supp. 638 (D.
Minn. 1956).
Whether the Lanham Act has created a federal law of unfair competition is a conflict which has not been resolved. If it does, the Erie
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doctrine will have no bearing on unfair competition cases. If it does
not, then the Erie doctrine would be applicable to unfair competition cases, and unfair competition would be a matter of state law.
Until the Supreme Court decides the issue, it seems that each circuit
may construe the Lanham Act as it sees fit.
Although it appears that the principal case is based on sound
legal principles, it is submitted that a federal law or unfair competition would be preferable to requiring the federal courts to follow
the state laws of unfair competition in a field such as trade-marks
where uniformity would appear to be desirable.

R. W. Calloway

Procedure -

Judicial Estoppel -

Sworn Statements

A mineral deed was executed to Mrs. Knox with no recital that
the interest conveyed was her separate property. Consideration for
the mineral deed was paid out of community funds. There was no
showing that Mr. Knox intended a gift of his interest in the property to Mrs. Knox. A creditor of Mr. Knox sought execution on the
property. Mr. and Mrs. Knox joined in a suit to enjoin the creditor's
execution, and in an application for a temporary restraining order
Mr. and Mrs. Knox swore under oath that the property was the
separate property of Mrs. Knox. The temporary restraining order
was granted. The creditor ceased his efforts to execute on the
property in question, and the suit to enjoin his execution was dismissed for want of prosecution. After the death of Mr. Knox,
Mrs. Long, his child and sole heir and administratrix of his estate,
brought a trespass to try title suit to recover her father's alleged
community interest in the property. Held: Mrs. Long is judicially
estopped from maintaining that the property is not the separate
property of Mrs. Knox because of Mr. Knox's sworn statement in
the earlier suit. Long v. Knox,-Tex.-, 291 S.W.2d 292 (1956).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel as adopted by the Supreme Court
in the principal case in an innovation in Texas jurisprudence. Comment, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 44 (1956). Formerly, the Texas courts
had applied another type of estoppel in similar situations. This was
an equitable estoppel which prohibited a party from maintaining a
position inconsistent with that made by him in a prior proceeding if
certain elements were present. The former proceeding must have
ended in final judgment, and the inconsistent position must have
been successfully maintained. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 163 S.W.2d
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251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The party invoking the estoppel must
have been an adverse party in the former suit. Smith v. Chipley, 118
Tex. 415, 16 S.W.2d 269 (1929). The party claiming the estoppel
must have changed his position in reliance on the former position,
Koppelman v. Koppelman, 94 Tex. 40, 57 S.W. 570 (1900), and to
allow the inconsistent position must be unjust to that party. Smith
v. Chipley, supra.
Judicial estoppel, applied in the principal case, differs essentially
from equitable estoppel in that the elements of reliance and injury
need not be present. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn.
633, 266 S.W. 313 (1921). The doctrine is based on considerations
of justice and public policy and is designed to protect the sanctity
of the oath. Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 5 Sneed 39 (Tenn. 1856).
This doctrine of judicial estoppel was originated and developed in
the courts of Tennessee and has not been followed in any other
state, except Texas in this decision. So it is to the cases of Tennessee
that we must look for application of this principle.
The essence of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is that a party
will not be allowed to contradict in a later proceeding a statement
he has made under oath in the course of a previous proceeding or
earlier in the same proceeding. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co.,
supra. The later statement must amount to a categorical denial of
the earlier. Monroe County Motor Co. v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co.,
33 Tenn. App. 223, 231 S.W.2d 386 (1950). The statement giving
rise to the estoppel may occur in sworn pleadings, depositions, or oral
testimony. Corder v. Sprouse, 20 Tenn. App. 486, 100 S.W.2d 1001
(1936) ;Williams v. Nottingham, 19 Tenn. App. 162, 84 S.W.2d 114
(1935). However, it must be made in the course of a judicial proceeding, or no judicial estoppel will arise. Heifer v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n., 170 Tenn. 630, 96 S.W.2d 1103 (1936).
The party invoking judicial estoppel need not have been a party
to the earlier proceeding or have even known of the prior statement. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., supra. The party against
whom the estoppel is sought to be invoked may defeat the doctrine
by showing that the earlier statement was made by mistake or
accident, or through fraud or duress, or by any degree of negligence
short of wilful lying, D. M. Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499,
206 S.W.2d 897 (1947), and the burden of showing such excusing
circumstances is on the party attempting to change his statement.
Warner v. Maroney, 16 Tenn. App. 78, 66 S.W.2d 244 (1932).
If such a showing is not made, the estoppel acts as an absolute bar

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol.

I11

to a present inconsistent statement. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co.,
supra. When the party, if living, would be estopped, his heirs and
privies in estate will likewise be estopped. Melton v. Anderson, 32
Tenn. App. 335, 222 S.W.2d 666 (1949).
Some Tennessee cases seem to have confused judicial estoppel with
equitable estoppel. As a result, there is language to the effect that
for a judicial estoppel to arise, someone must have acted in reliance
on the statement to his prejudice. Allen v. Westbrook, 16 Lea 251
(Tenn. 1886). Also, it has been held that opinions of law will not
give rise to judicial estoppel. Tate v. Tate, 126 Tenn. 169, .148
S.W. 1048 (1912). Some cases state that judicial estoppel will arise
only from statements of fact and not from statements of opinion.
Schultz v. Bell, 23 Tenn. App. 258, 130 S.W.2d 149 (1939). However, all of these qualifications seem unwarranted when considered
in the light of the theory upon which the doctrine is based. As
Anderson, J., in Melton v. Anderson, supra, states it, ". . . the
rule rests not upon prejudice to the individual, but prejudice to the
administration of justice and hence to society . . . " Therefore, the
above rules, borrowed from equitable estoppel, may serve to defeat
the very purpose behind the doctrine of judicial estoppel in given
cases. Although opinions have used loose and confusing language at
times, they have applied the doctrine in conformity with its basic
idea - that when a person willfully swears under oath to one thing
in an attempt to gain an advantage, he will not be allowed subsequently to maintain an inconsistent position. Although our court
does not consider these problems in the principal case, no doubt
there will be occasion in the future to consider them. In applying a
doctrine altogether new, there may be a tendency on the part of
those applying it to use inadvertently the formulas applied in an old
and familiar doctrine resembling the new one. This avenue to confusion should certainly be avoided.
In the principal case the Court was undoubtedly struck by the
apparent immorality of misuse of the judicial process. To combat this
immorality the Court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. It
could not apply equitable estoppel since the party invoking the
estoppel had in no way changed her position in reliance on the
previous statement and would suffer no injury from a change.
Neither could it apply the rules concerning conveyances in fraud
of creditors since there was no conveyance in this case. In finding
a judicial estoppel the Court did not indicate that it was making
new law. But for the Tennessee authorities cited, one might think that
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this doctrine is well known in Texas from a reading of the opinion.
The Court purported to distinguish a number of previous Texas
cases to show that they are not contrary to the present decision. But
in attempting to distinguish these cases, the Court seemed to use
equitable estoppel as its frame of reference, which it had supposedly
put to one side in applying judicial estoppel. This portion of the
opinion was not necessary to the decision and makes for confusion
in understanding judicial estoppel.
The two doctrines, one an equitable estoppel and the other a
device of public policy, are not mutually repugnant. While equitable
estoppel may apply to any sort of representation made in a judicial
proceeding, it must be remembered that the new doctrine applies
only to sworn statements made therein. Thus, both doctrines may
apply to the same set of facts, as where a statement made under
oath in a proceeding which ends in a final judgment is relied on
by the adverse party so that he changes his position and would be
injured by a denial in a later suit. Here the party who made the
statement in the prior suit is both judically and equitably estopped to
deny the statement. Yet either doctrine may apply to a set of
facts to which the other does not. In the principal case no equitable
estoppel was applicable, but judicial estoppel arose because the statement was made under oath. Had that statement not been made under
oath but the injunction suit had ended in a final judgment and the
creditor had changed his position in reliance on the statement, Mrs.
Long would not have been judicially estopped to deny the statement but would have been equitably estopped to do so to the detriment of the creditor. It would seem the Supreme Court has not
changed existing Texas law by its decision in the principal case; it
has simply made new law.
David M. Woolley

Procedure -

Mandamus -

Discretionary Acts

R, successor trustee under a testamentary trust, instituted an
action to recover property left in trust for testator's three grandchildren. D, one of the grandchildren who had already reached the
age when the proceeds were to be distributed, filed a cross action
against R and a third party defendant, a bank. The bank filed an
answer and a cross action against all other parties for a declaratory
judgment as to the extent of its libality. D later applied for a stay
of the procedings under the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act,
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on the ground that he was then on active duty. R then filed a motion
to have his suit against D dismissed with prejudice, and it seems, asked
for severance which would result in two different law suits. After
the court granted the stay requested by D and overruled the motion
for a severance, R brought this original action in the Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant the severance. Held: Trial Court erred in refusing the severance and this
error could be corrected by mandamus. A write of mandamus will
issue in respect to a discretionary matter to correct a clear abuse of
discretion. Womack v. Berry, - Tex. -, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956)
(7 - 2 decision).
Most jurisdictions follow the rule that mandamus will not issue
to a public board, commission or judge when there is any other
adequate remedy, but that when there is no such remedy it will
issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty or exercise of
discretion. Metcalf v. Howard, 304 Ky. 498, 201 S.W.2d 197
(1947). However, mandamus will not issue to review or control a
discretionary act once the official has acted. Lissner v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, 23 Cal.2d 711, 146 P.2d 232 (1944). That
mandamus will issue where there has been a clear abuse of discretion
is the recognized exception to the general rule, Green v. Superior
Court of San Francisco, 133 Cal.App. 35, 23 P.2d 785 (1933), and
for there to be a clear abuse of discretion the official must have
acted wholly through fraud, caprice, or by a purely arbitrary decision and without reason. State ex rel. Beffa v. Superior Court for
Whatcom County, 3 Wash.2d 184, 100 P.2d 6 (1940).
The Texas Supreme Court has followed the general rule as to
when mandamus will issue, Sansom, Mayor v. Merceretal, 68 Tex.
588, 5 S.W. 62 (1887);Matthaei v. Clark, 110 Tex. 114, 216 S.W.
8 56 (1919); but the principal case is the first Texas case to apply
the exception thereto. The majority of the cases have unequivocally
stated that mandamus will never issue in matters of a discretionary
character, Anchor v. Martin, 116 Tex. 409, 292 S.W. 877 (1927);
Morton's Estate v. Chapman, 124 Tex. 42, 75 S.W.2d 876 (1934) ;
Hunsinger v. Boyd, 119 Tex. 182, 26 S.W.2d 905 (1930); although
a few decisions have said by way of dictum that mandamus will issue
where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. City of San Antonio
v. Zogheib, 129 Tex. 141, 101 S.W. 2d 539 (1937); City of Houston
v. Adams, - Tex. -, 279 S.W.2d 308 (1955). It is interesting to
note the fine distinction between what is ministerial and what is
discretionary which have been made by the court in some of the cases
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which flatly state that mandamus will never issue in discretionary
matter. For example, it has been held that the rendering of judgment
on a verdict is a ministerial duty when the verdict clearly entitles the
party asking mandamus to judgment, Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 285 S.W. 296 (1926), but the directing of a
verdict on these same facts is a discretionary matter. Cortimeglis v.
Davis, 116 Tex. 412, 292 S.W. 875 (1927); Bussanetal v. Holland,

235 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
In the principal case, the court recognized that the granting of a
severance is a discretionary matter but said that the judge had clearly
abused his discretion in refusing a severance and that mandamus
would issue to correct the abuse. Although not expressly, it would
appear that the court has overruled, at least in part, the many
earlier cases that have said without reservation that mandamus will
not issue to control the exercise of judicial discretion. However, when
the earlier cases are examined more closely, it would appear that in
most instances the court was calling acts ministerial which were
nothing but clear abuses of discretion by the trial judge.
It is submitted that the principal case might be criticized on the
grounds that it appears doubtful, under the facts before the court,
that there was an actual abuse of discretion on the judge's part, since
it seems probable that D would be prejudiced in his counter suit.
It has been assumed in the foregoing discussion that the severance
asked for was for all purposes. However, the opinion is not entirely
clear on this. If the severance was only for convenience then nothing
has been actually accomplished since there can be no final judgment
until all issues have been disposed of.
Geo. R. Alexander, Jr.

Real Property - Landlord and Tenant
Purchase of Tax Title

-

Tenant's

Lands belonging to A were sold to pay delinquent taxes thereon. A
failed to redeem the lands within the statutory two year period, and
B, who had been a tenant of A, remained on the land thereafter for
three years as an adverse possessor. When the county treasurer delivered the tax deeds to the State Tax Commissioner, and the lands
were offered for sale to the public, B purchased the land. He then
conveyed the land to C, who brought an action to quiet title against
A. Held: A tenant, who owes no duty to the landlord to pay taxes
on the land, and who has not withheld rent due or lulled his land-
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lord into tax delinquency in some other manner, may properly buy
a tax title to the land and assert it. Gore v. Cone, 60 N.M. 29, 287
P.2d 229 (1955).

Under the common law a tenant could not deny the title of his
landlord without first surrendering possession of the land, the basis
being an equitable estoppel which precluded a tenant from attacking
the title under which he entered upon the land. Cooke v. Loxley, 5
T.R. 4, 101 Eng. Rep. 2 (1792). There were certain exceptions under
the common law rule, however, one of them being that a tenant may
always show that his landlord has lost his title by judgment and
operation of law. Langford v. Selmes, 3 K. & J. 220, 69 Eng. Rep.
1089 (1857). This exception has been adopted generally by the
American courts, Woods v. Woods, 216 Ark. 639, 226 S.W.2d 961
(1950), unless the tenant has lulled the landlord into the tax delinquency. Where the tenant is in arrears in his rental, most courts hold
that he cannot purchase a tax title and assert it against his landlord.
Eckert v. Miller, 57 Ariz. 94, 111 P.2d 60 (1941); contra: Manning
v. Oakes, 80 Neb. 471, 114 N.W. 604 (1908). Where the tenant has
a statutory or contractual duty to pay the taxes on the land, the
courts unanimously invoke the estoppel to prevent acquisition of
the real estate. Davey v. Meier, 117 Ind. App. 577, 73 N.E.2d 56
(1947). Thus it would seem that the common law rule and its exception are predicated upon the theory that the estoppel is limited to the
title as it existed at the commencement of the lease, and that a tenant
may subsequently assert any change in the relationship as long as the
tenant has not brought about the change by wrongful conduct.
The minority view in this country is that the estoppel continues
as long as the tenant is in possession, regardless of any change of title,
and consequently that the purchase by the tenant must be treated
as a payment of the taxes and a redemption of the real estate in
order that the title of the landlord and the possessory rights of the
tenant may be preserved. Crim v. Holcombe, 254 Ala. 692, 49 So.2d
277 (1950). There is also a compromise view which allows the tenant
to purchase in his own right but estops him from asserting title b,
tax deed until he surrenders possession of the land after the termination of his tenancy. Johnson v. Langston, 179 Miss. 622, 176 So. 531
(1937).
The minority courts usually recognize that the estoppel is a technical one, not a legal one, for the tenant has done nothing to estop
himself; yet they insist upon enforcing it on the broad grounds of
public policy. In many instances it is true that a tenant should be
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estopped to esablish title adverse to that of his landlord, whom he
has continuously acknowledged as such; yet in the tax deed situation
it is submitted that the rule has no application, for it is the conduct
of the landlord and not the misconduct of the tenant which has
caused the former to lose his title.
In the principal case the defendant landlord argued the common
law rule, but the court found that the fact situation justified the use
of the exception since the landlord had lost his title through operation
of law. Actually, there is no injustice under the holding, for the
landlord had a redemption period during which only he could make
application to regain the land by paying his taxes, and even after
the tax deeds were offered to the public, he had a right to repurchase the land provided his application was prior in time to any
other application. From point of legal theory, there is justification
for estopping the tenant only where he has occasioned the landlord's
misfortunes, and where the tenant has violated no duty owed the
landlord the title he obtains from the state should be regarded as a
new and independent title which has cut off any right, title or interest
in the landlord.
It is submitted that the rule of this case should not be extended
beyond its facts to allow a tenant to assert a tax title against his
cotenant or the landlord's remainderman, or to allow one mortgagee
to prevail over a successive mortgagee at a tax sale. Unless the remainderman, cotenant or successive mortgagee owned a duty to pay
the taxes and failed to do so, the purchase by the tenant should inure
to the benefit of the remaining estate, so that no injury will be sustained by a party whose actions have not occasioned the tax delinquency and the subsequent tax sale.

Ivan Irwin, Jr.

Taxation

-

"Convenience of Employer" Rule

-Applicability

to Partners

D and his wife were co-partners and owners of a hotel which they
managed themselves. In order to run the business properly, they
foundit necessary to live on the premises and eat most of their meals
there. They owned a home separate and apart from the hotel, but
were unable to use it very often. The Tax Court determined that the
costs of the taxpayers' food and lodging at the hotel were business
expenses and ruled that D and his wife were entitled to deduct those
amounts in computing their income tax for 1950. The Commissioner
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appealed. Held: Partners who take their meals and lodging on the
business premises are not entitled to deduct the costs as business expenses under the "convenience of employer" rule which allows employees to exclude such benefits from their taxable income; such
costs are personal expenses and nondeductible. Commissioner v. Doak,
234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939, under which the principal case
was decided, provided that no taxpayer could deduct any personal,
living, or family expenses in computing his net income. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, §24(a)(1), 56 STAT. 819 (1942). Correlatively,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled that an employee receiving, in
addition to his salary, compensation in the form of living quarters
or meals should include the fair market value of such benefits in his
gross income; however, this was not necessary if the meals and/or
lodging were furnished for the "convenience of the employer." U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(a)-3

(1943).

Effective January 1, 1949,

the Commissioner directed that the "convenience of employer" rule
should be primarily an administrative test to be applied when the
character of the benefits as compensation could not be determined
otherwise. Mim. 6472, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 15.

It was against this background that the federal trial courts held
that partners who lived and ate on the business premises for the
purpose of management were, like employees, not required to include in income the value of meals and lodging. Papineau v. Commissoner, 16 T.C. 130 (1951); Briggs v. U.S., 4 P-H 1956 FED.
TAX SERV. para. 72319 (D. Colo. 1955). The instant case overruled
those and other decisions on this point, with the Court basing its
decision on early cases which had held that a partner could not be an
employee of the partnership, see, e.g., Pauli v. Commissioner, 11
B.T.A. 784 (1928), and on a strict construction of the word "employees" as used in the Treasury Regulations in effect in 1950. Thus,
the Court of Appeals adopted the "aggregate" concept of partnership identity, which accepts the view that a partnership and the
partners comprising it are inseparable for purposes of taxation.
The position adopted here has confused, rather than clarified, the
situation as it applies to partners. Clearly, the majority of the Court
chose to decide the case on the grounds of the deductibility or nondeductibility of expenses personal in nature. In order to do this,
they were effectively forced to disregard the partnership as a taxcomputing entity and to treat the partners as individuals. Unfortunately the opinion cited the provision of the 1954 Tax Code which
I
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enacted the "convenience of employer" rule into statutory form.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §119. This raises the inference that the
rule of the Doak case will be applied to future situations in which
partners seek to invoke Section 119 in computing their individual
returns. It would follow that where the partner is the recipient of
benefits which do not entitle him to the non-includability provision
of Section 119, the firm may not deduct these expenses in computing
the partnership net income. Seemingly, this would be true even
though the costs are legitimate business expenses.
In the principal case, Doak's tax liability probably would not
have been changed had the Court adopted the alternate course and
found that the costs were business expenses of the partnership, but
were not excludable from the partners' individual gross income because the benefits were not given for the convenience of the employer. Nevertheless, acknowledging that the result was correct does
not admit the correctness of the holding. If the case is followed in the
future, it will result in a reduction of the distributive share of partnership income belonging to an outside investor in the partnership,
even though the costs of meals and lodging paid to a resident manager-partner are legitimate business expenses as far as the "outsider"
is concerned.
Further, the 1954 Code, §707, provides that a partner dealing with
a partnership in a capacity other than as a member shall be treated as
a stranger to the firm. The latter provision applies only for the purpose of determining the partnership's gross income and business expenses. Thus for certain purposes the 1954 Code clearly adopts the
"entity" theory of partnership identity, and holds the firm as
separable from its members in some cases. If the principal case
purports to define Section 119 of the 1954 Code, it could cause the
paradoxical situation of a court being forced to follow both the
"aggregate" and "entity" concepts in the same case.
As an illustration, a firm consisting of a husband and wife and
an outside investor could draw up articles of agreement providing
for the hiring of a manager at a guaranteed salary to be paid without
regard to partnership income, and further providing that the manager should live and eat on the premises as a condition of employment. If a partner were hired as manager, the court would treat the
partnership as an entity as to the salary and allow the firm to deduct
the cost as a business expense, but would not allow the expenses of
meals and lodging to be deducted in computing the net income of the
partnership. This would be an obvious injustice to the outside in-
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vestor, particularly since the deduction would probably be allowed
if a stranger were hired. Where a partnership must employ a resident
manager in order that the activities of the business be conducted
properly, it logically should make no difference whether the manager
is a partner or a stranger.
It is submitted that the proper course would have been to allow
the partners in the Doak case to take their deduction from the partnership's gross income and then decide independently on the partners' individual returns whether they could exclude the benefits from
their income on the basis of the "convenience of employer" rule.
Also, it would have been better had the ,Court not considered the
personal nature of the expenses in deter'mining whether or not the
benefits were excludable. There is nothing in the Code to justify
the use of this criterion. Such a holding would have been a more
just solution so far as other partnerships are concerned and would not
have cast a shadow on the 1954 Code provisions. It would further
have permitted a holding that the employer deducts the cost of the
benefits and the employee either includes or excludes their market
value, which may be more or less than the cost to the employer. In
future cases, this holding should be confined to the facts, or be regarded as having no effect on present tax law; the latter choice seems
best in the light of the Court's language and the complete change
in the Code.
Eugene L. Smith

Torts -

Negligence -

Res Ipsa Loquitur

P, a passenger in a car driven by her husband, brought this action
against her husband's insurer for injuries suffered by her when the
car unaccountably left the road. P introduced no direct evidence of
her husband's negligence but, instead, requested the court to instruct
the jury on res ipsa loquitur. D introduced inconclusive evidence that
the husband had suffered a heart atack immediately prior to the
accident. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur and directed a verdict for D. Held: Reversed. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not made inapplicable by the introduction of
inconclusive evidence of a fact which, if proved, might reasonably be
inferred to have been the cause of the accident. Wood v. Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America, 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 610
(1956)

(5-2 decision).

Ordinarily, in a suit based on negligence, the defendant is not
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presumed to have been negligent, Wells v. Texas Pac. Coal d Oil Co.,
140 Tex. 2, 164 S.W.2d 660 (1942); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Le
Normand, 100 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1938); and it is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove the allegations of negligence which form the basis of
his case. Chicago, R.I. e G. Ry. Co. v. Myers, 264 S.W. 151 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924). However, in certain fact situations the mere proof
of an accident and the surrounding circumstances creates an inference,
by virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that the defendant was
negligent and allows the case to go to the jury without any direct
proof of specific acts of negligence. Yarbroughs, Inc. v. McNabb,
222 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.; Chiles v.
Ft. Smith Commission Co., 139 Ark. 489, 216 S.W. 11 (1919). The
Court in the principal case assumed that this doctrine was applicable to the situation where a car traveling along a straight road unaccountably turns off the road and is wrecked, and this assumption
appears valid. Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39
(1936); Bennett v. Edward, 239 App.Div. 157, 267 N.Y.S. 417
(1933).
The principal issue in the instant case concerned the sufficiency
of the evidence which a defendant must tender in order to rebut the
inference of negligence raised by application of res ipsa loquitur.
One line of cases appears to hold the introduction of any rebutting
evidence by the defendant will be sufficient to nullify the inference

raised by the doctrine. Louisville & N.R.C. v. Marbury Lumber Co.,
125 Ala. 237, 28 So. 438 (1900); Scarelli v. Washington Water
Power Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870 (1911). On the other hand,
a majority of the courts hold that where the plaintiff's proof of
negligence is based solely on res ipsa loquitur and the defendant offers
rebutting evidence, the court should not take the case from the jury
and direct a verdict for the defendant unless the defendant's evidence
conclusively proves that the cause of the accident was nonactionable.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Hussey, 42 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1930), aff~d 283
U.S. 136 (1931); Wells v. Asher, 286 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955); Watts v. Richmond, F. & P.R. Co., 189 Va. 258, 52 S.E.2d
129 (1949). Texas apparently follows the majority rule, Gulf, C. d
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Durman, 27 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930);
for an excellent analysis of this problem see Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur
in Texas; 26 TExAs L. REV. 761, 777-8 (1948).
The defendant may be able to prove conclusively that a certain fact
or combination of facts proximately caused the accident and, in this
event, he would of course be entitled to a directed verdict. Sims v.
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Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 135 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
For example, suppose the plaintiff were injured by a falling electric
line. If the line had but a single break in it and if the fact that a
stray bullet broke the line were proved, that fact necessarily would
have caused the line to fall and proximately caused the injury. More
often, however, the defendant is forced to rely on a fact which, even
if proved, would not necessarily have been the cause of plaintiff's
injuries. This class of facts is typified by the evidence of heart attack
in the principal case. Even if the heart attack had been proved, it
was not necessarily the cause of the accident since it could have
occurred after the crash. Although an application of the majority
rule would have required the defendant to prove not only the heart
attack but also that it occurred prior to (and thus caused) the
accident, the Court modified that rule in this type fact situation
since it did not compel the defendant to prove the causal connection
between the heart attack and the accident; it only compelled him to
prove conclusively the existence of a fact (the heart attack) which,
by its nature, was related to the situation at the time of the accident
in such a manner as to make possible a reasonable inference that it
caused the wreck.
The decision in the principal case appears sound, since the rule is
well established that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply
unless it is more reasonably probable that an accident was due to the
defendant's negligence than to another fact. Emmons v. Texas & P.
Ry. Co., 149 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism. judgm.
cor.; Alley v. Texas Electric Service Co., 134 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939); Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 (1919).
Yet it is submitted that, under certain circumstances, the holding
should be limited. Thus, where the defendant has greater access to or
knowledge of the evidence than the plaintiff, as is probably more
often the case, the defendant should not be able to obtain a directed
verdict on proof of one fact alone but should be required to go
further in his proof and show that the circumstances concerning the
fact are such as to make it likely that there was a causal connection
between the fact and the accident.
William T. Blackburn
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Right of Privacy - Publication of Photograph of
Dead Body

Plaintiffs brought action for invasion of their rights of privacy
after defendants published photographs in their respective news-

papers showing the partially decomposed bodies of the plaintiffs'
children upon discovery of the missing bodies. Held: The individual
right of privacy is not superior to matters of legitimate public
interest. Waters v. Fleetwood, -Ga.-, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956); and

Bremer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Company, -Iowa-,

76

N.W.2d 762 (1956).
The right of privacy was not recognized in the early common
law, but it has now been established in all but a few jurisdictions in
the United States. PROSSER, TORTS, 636 (2d ed 1955). The interests
to be protected are the individual's rights of freedom from unwarranted publicity and to pursue happiness by remaining in selusion if
heso desires. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931);
Munden v. Harris, 155 Mo. App. 445, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
Despite an early refusal to extend the right to the unauthorized use
of an individual's picture, Atkinson v. John E. Doherty E§ Co., 121
Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899); Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), later decisions have
held such a publication to be an actionable invasion of the right of
privacy. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.

68 (1904); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq.
136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907). Some decisions have hinged recovery on the
basis of an invasion of a property right. Haelan Laboratoriesv. Topps
Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Others have granted
relief solely for the protection of personal feelings. Brazemore v.
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). In the absence
of a Supreme Court decision, Texas has refused to recognize the
right of privacy because it did not exist in the common law at the
time the State Constitution was adopted. Milner v. Red River Valley
Pub. Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (TEx. Civ. App. 1952); McCullagh v.
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1954). For a
criticism of the Texas reasoning see Seavey, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 309 (1953).
It is generally recognized that the right of privacy must sometimes yield when it conflicts with matters of legitimate news interest
to the public. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867, comment c (1939).
When an individual becomes a part of a newsworthy event, the
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constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and the public
interest in the free dissemination of news have been held to be
superior to the individual's injured feelings. Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, 35 Cal. App.2d 79, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Smith v. Doss,
251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948). The scope of legitimate public
interest has been extended to include pictures of a robbery victim,
Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27
N.E.2d 753 (1940); a principal to a divorce proceeding, Berg v.
Minneapolis Star Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948);
and a woman who tried to fight off her husband's assailants, Jones
v. Herald Post, 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929). Liability was
denied for publication of a picture of the corpse of an accident victim
on the ground that the limits of legitimate news are too hard to
define. Kelly v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
However, other courts have granted relief where the intrusions have
gone beyond the limits of decency. Barber v. Time Inc., 348 Mo.
1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (publication of pictures of a woman
in a hospital gown which were an unnecessary part of a medical report of her treatment for a rare internal disorder.)
The extent to which public interest will abrogate the right of
privacy depends upon the court's evaluation of the benefit to the
public as compared to the harm done to the individual. It has been
held that the public has no legitimate interest in the publication of a
picture of a deformed child, Brazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171
Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506,
149 S. W. 849 (1912), a picture of a woman who had been the
victim of gas poisoning, Elmhurst v. Shoreham Hotel, 58 F. Supp.
485 (D. D.C. 1945), or ficitonalized accounts of news events.
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
The principal cases deny recovery on the theory that the privilege
of freedom of the press is absolute if a public interest in the event can
be established. These decisions have not determined whether the
privilege to publish newsworthy items may become qualified when
the benefit to the public is slight as compared to the mental
anguish suffered by the plaintiff. Another element which deserves
consideration is whether the publication is offensive to members of
the public. If a picture is distasteful to the average viewer, the
benefit to the public from its publication is harder to establish; contrariwise, the invasion of plaintiff's interest in freedom from mental
anguish is more easily shown and is probably more extreme.
The rights of freedom of the press and the right to privacy are
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sometimes in direct conflict. Establishing the limits of either is a
matter of harmonizing individual rights with community interest.
While it is true that the law cannot provide a remedy for every
human grievance, a publication which goes beyond what good conscience and public mores will tolerate should be actionable.
John H. McElhaney

Wills

-

Disinheritance Provision
Children Statutes

-

Pretermitted

Testator's will provided that "If . . .any person who if I died
intestate would be entitled to share in my estate, shall, in any manner
whatsoever, directly or indirectly contest this will . . . then I hereby
bequeath to each such person the sum of One Dollar. .. only . ..."
Plaintiff, child of the testator, claimed to be a pretermitted heir under
a statute which provided that if a testator failed to provide for his
child in his will, then such child should take by intestacy, unless the
omission appeared intentional from the face of the will. Held: A
provision in a will for any person who, if testator had died intestate,
would be entitled to share in the estate is sufficient to prevent a child
from being pretermitted. Van Strien v. Jones, Ex'r., - Cal. -, 299
P.2d 1 (1956).
A pretermitted child is a child of the testator who is passed by,
omitted, or disregarded in the will of his parent; if the child is provided for in the will, even with something of small value, the child
is not pretermitted. McQueen v. Stephens, 100 S.W.2d 1053 (TEx.
Civ. App. 1937). The term does not include the grandchildren of the
testator, McQueen v. Stephens, supra, nor his illegitimate offspring.
Brewster v. Brewster, 271 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). At
common law, failure of a testator to provide for his children, even
when wholly inadvertent, left the children without remedy. Goff v.
Goff. 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944). Statutes have been
enacted in many states to give relief in such cases, see ATKINSON,
WILLS §36 (2nd ed. 1953), and it has been held that the basic purpose
of these statutes is to guard against hardship to the children due to
oversight of the testator, rather than to control his right to dispose
of property by will, the legal presumption being that the parent did
not intend to disinherit his children. Porter v. Porter's Ex'r, 120 Ky.
302, 86 S.W. 546 (1905); In re Fell's Estate, 70 Idaho 399, 219
P.2d 941 (1950). Under the so-called Missouri type statute, unless
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the testator mentions or provides for his children in the will, the
children are pretermitted and take their intestate share without
regard to the will. Walker v. Case, 211 Ark. 1091, 204 S.W.2d 543
(1947). However, under the Massachusetts type statute, even though
the testator fails to mention or provide for his children in his will,
they do not take by intestacy if such omission appears from the face
of the will to have been intentional. In re Dixon's Estate, 28 Cal.
App.2d 598, 83 P.2d 98 (1938).
Texas statutes provide that a posthumous pretermitted child, and
after-born and after-adopted pretermitted children, take by intestacy
unless the testator leaves the estate to the surviving wife in the former
situation or to the surviving spouse in the latter; however, if no child
was living when the will was made, and at testator's death there are
pretermitted children, the will is void in its entirety, unless the child
dies within one year after testator's death. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
(1925),

PROBATE CODE,

§ 66, 67 (a) and (b); Hill v. Joseffy, 259

S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
The Court in the principal case, dealing with a Massachusetts type
statute, was not confronted with a general provision for "any contestants of the will," such provision being generally not sufficient to
include heirs otherwise pretermitted. In re Estate of Cochran, 116

Cal. App.2d 98, 253 P.2d 41 (1953). The provision in question for
"any person who if I died intestate would be entitled to share in
my estate

. .

." was held to be a provision for the heirs of the testator.

The word "heirs" in such circumstances includes children, and so indicates that the testator intended to provide nominally for his children, or to disinherit them. In re Hassel, 168 Cal. 287, 142 Pac. 838

(1914). By providing nominally for his children as a class, the
testator may effectively disinherit his children without specially
naming them in his will. In re Lombard, 16 Cal. App.2d 526, 60 P.2d
1000 (1936). The dissenting opinion, however, reasoned that the
provision in question was merely a general provision for contestants
of the will and did not include children within its meaning, because
it is well settled that pretermitted children do not contest a will but,
rather, take by intestacy. In re Price's Estate, 56 Cal. App.2d 335,
132 P.2d485 (1942).
It is submitted that the majority opinion in the principal case is
better reasoned, for if the words ". . . any person who if I died intestate would be entitled to share in my estate. . ." have any meaning, it

certainly includes the testator's children. If the dissent's reasoning
had been followed, a testator under either type of statute would
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have to name his children in his will in order to disinherit them. For
various personal reasons the testator may not want to do this, and
properly should be allowed to express his intent to disinherit in the
manner used in the principal case.

Carroll Jarnagin

